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From Imitation to Litigation: Expanded

Protection for Commercial Property
Rights in Identity
I. Introduction
Just thirty-five years ago, no one had ever heard of the right of
publicity. Today, it is a dynamic new area of litigation that grows
and changes with each new case. The right of publicity is loosely
defined as a person's right to control the commercial property rights
in their identity or persona.' Infringement of the right occurs when
an advertiser, without authorization, imitates or appropriates some
aspect of the plaintiffs identity for the advertiser's commercial gain.
To maintain an action for infringement of the right of publicity, the
plaintiff must be identifiable from the total context of the advertiser's use of the plaintiffs persona.' Part of the current debate revolves around what elements constitute one's persona and to what
3
extent that persona is protected from commercial exploitation.
Originally, the right of publicity protected against the unauthorized commercial use of one's name and likeness.4 Several recent
cases, however, have extended protection to one's voice and style despite minimal or adverse precedent. 5 In addition, one court has allowed punitive damages in an action for infringement of the right of
publicity.' These significant changes expanding protection under a
persona in toto concept are questioned as extending beyond the intended scope of the right of publicity. This Comment demonstrates
that recent developments flow naturally from the historical progresI. See Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981).
MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY § 4.9, at 4-48, 4-49
(1988) [hereinafter MCCARTHY].
3. The term "persona" represents the bundle of commercial values embodied in a person's identity. The persona consists of name, likeness, nickname, voice, style, or any other
indicia that identify the person or personality in question. The right of publicity recognizes
that certain persons have commercial value because they attract consumer attention to an
advertisement that features or reminds the consumer of that person. As such, the right of
publicity protects those aspects of one's persona that identify the person to the consuming
public. See id. § 4.9, at 4-48, 4-49.
4. See, e.g., Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
5. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1986), discussed infra
notes 127-44 and accompanying text.
6. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., No. 88-06478 (9th Cir. May 8, 1990), discussed infra
notes 173-91 and accompanying text.

2. See J. THOMAS
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sion and expansion of the right of publicity.
The plaintiff need not prove intent to appropriate in order to
7
state a cause of action for infringement of the right of publicity.
However, an analysis of relevant case law reveals that courts historically place a high degree of emphasis on the defendant's intent. In
cases where the defendant clearly intended to imitate the plaintiff,
but where the law at the time would preclude recovery, courts have
expanded the right of publicity in order to rule in favor of the plaintiff. Each ground-breaking decision has come in a case where evidence clearly showed the defendant's intent to appropriate the plaintiff's identity without compensation, but where the plaintiff was
without remedy under the existing scope of the law.
This Comment evaluates the progression of the right of publicity to its current status and advocates the need for procedural modifications. Part II of this Comment explains the origin of the right of
publicity. Part III examines the right's initial recognition and its
subsequent development by legal commentators. Part IV analyzes
the right's most prolific period of judicial development and expansion. Part V assesses the current state of the law and the significance
of the defendant's intent as a factor in the right of publicity's expansion. Part VI analyzes recent decisions affecting the availability of
the parody defense and punitive damages in right of publicity actions. Finally, Part VII demonstrates the need for procedural
changes in damage calculations resulting from recent decisions.
II.

Background

To fully understand and appreciate the current state of the right
of publicity, it is necessary to understand the historical development
of the right. The right of publicity evolved from the traditional common law right of privacy and the related tort of misappropriation of
name or likeness.8 Although the so-called "right of privacy" was
fairly well-established, the privacy label caused trouble when celeb7. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3.6[A], at 3-23.
8. Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981).
9. The "right to privacy" was the brainchild of Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis. Their famous article concluded that the law should prevent other people and the media
from prying into one's private life. The article recognized the emotional harm and embarrassing situation that can arise if such facts were exposed without the person's permission. Warren
and Brandeis stated that "[tlhe general object in view is to protect the privacy of private life.
[T]he matters of which publication should be repressed may be described as those which concern the private life, habits, acts, and relations of an individual . . . .Some things . . .are
entitled to [be kept] from public popular curiosity." Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 215-16 (1890).

RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

rity plaintiffs began appearing in court.1"
Celebrities are defined as famous or well-publicized persons of
noted character. 1 Because a celebrity's name or picture appears in
the media so often, traditional privacy principles held that a celebrity's fame and public presence constituted a waiver of the celebrity's right to privacy in his or her picture or name. 2 Confusion resulted over how to maintain a publicity action when the underlying
privacy right had been waived. O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co. 3 provides
an excellent example of how this confusion prevented recovery under
a right to privacy theory.
David O'Brien was a well-known football player." O'Brien sued
Pabst Beer Company for its unauthorized use of O'Brien's photograph in the company's promotional calendar.' 5 O'Brien was particularly upset about the unauthorized use of his photograph because of
his involvement in an organization that discouraged use of alcohol by
young people and because he had previously refused offers to endorse
alcoholic products.' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed
O'Brien's privacy claim, stating that he was not a private person who
could be harmed by Pabst's unauthorized use.' 7 The court stated
that "the publicity he got was only that which he had been constantly seeking and receiving . . . . The case was not for the value
of plaintiff's name in advertising a product but for damages by way
of injury to him in using his name in advertising beer."' 8 While commentators have criticized the majority in O'Brien as "operating on a
false premise,"'" the dissent in O'Brien expressed early support for
the right of publicity. 0
10. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1.6, at 1-28.
I1. See WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 290 (2d ed. 1983).
12. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1.6, at 1-28.
13. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
14. O'Brien played college football at Texas Christian University and established a national reputation as an All-American. He then went on to a highly successful professional
football career with the Philadelphia Eagles. See id. at 168.
15. Interestingly, the photo was obtained from the publicity department of Texas Christian University. See id. at 169.
16. Id. Note the similarity in Tin Pan Apple v. Miller Brewing Co., Inc., 737 F. Supp.
826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), discussed infra notes 144-72 and accompanying text.
17. O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at 1-30.
20. The dissent focused on the commercial value of a celebrity's identity for advertising
purposes, stating that the majority's logic permits advertisers to "seize upon [the celebrity's]
popularity to increase their sales of any lawful article without compensation of any kind for
such commercial use of [the star's] name and fame." O'Brien, 124 F.2d at 171. The dissent
ultimately prevailed since this concern was the basis for the origin of the right of publicity as
an independent cause of action.
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Early Development of the Right of Publicity
The Birth of an Action

The first affirmative recognition of the right of publicity came in
1953. Judge Jerome Frank coined the term "right of publicity" in
his now historic opinion, Haelan Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps Chew-

ing Gum, Inc.21 Judge Frank held that "in addition to and independent of that right of privacy . . . a man has a right to the publicity
value of his photograph . . . .This right might be called a right of

publicity."22 The court further recognized that the damage was of an
economic rather than an emotional nature 2a
Haelan and Topps were competitors in the baseball card industry, both vying for rights to use various players' pictures on their
cards.2" Haelan contended that Topps knowingly induced various
baseball stars to sign contracts with Topps even though they had
already signed exclusive contracts with Haelan.t 5 The Fifth Circuit
previously held there was no such thing as an exclusive license of
name or likeness, only a waiver of privacy. 26 Thus, although it was
not the primary issue in the case,27 the right of publicity was critical
to the decision.
To recognize Haelan's cause of action, the court would have to
find that the players had rights in their likeness which could be exclusively assigned. The court did just that, disaffirming the previous
Fifth Circuit decision. 8 The court coined the phrase "right of publicity" to represent a player's right to prevent unauthorized commercial use of his identity and the associated right to grant exclusive
privileges to use that identity in commercial contexts.29 Although the
court did not directly declare the right as one of property in a person's identity, its decision implicitly recognized the property-like nature of the right.30
The Haelan decision recognized the right of publicity and laid
21. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
22. Id. at 868.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 867.
25. Id.
26. See Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 1935).
27. The primary issue involved the intentional interference with contractual relations.
See generally Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
28. Id.at 869. "We do not agree with Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co." Id.
29. Id.at 868.
30. Judge Frank said it was not important whether the right was called property, "for
here, as often elsewhere, the tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a
claim which has pecuniary worth." Id.

RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

the groundwork for the right's development. However, it was legal
commentary rather than additional judicial decisions that developed
the right further. Several influential law review articles proposed
ideas that later would be adopted by courts as the rationale for expansion of the right of publicity.
B.

Legal Commentary Lays the Foundation

The first and perhaps most important article was written by
Professor Nimmer in 1954.31 This article cemented the concept of
the right of publicity and provided the foundation for the right of
publicity cases that followed.
Nimmer defined "publicity value" as the commercial worth of
one's name or picture when used for advertising purposes and recognized that traditional privacy law did not provide sufficient protection to a person's commercial interest in their identity.3 2 Nimmer
also noted that neither traditional trademark nor copyright law provided adequate protection, even when the claim was brought under
the heading of "unfair competition." 3 3 These areas of the law require
the plaintiff to prove that defendant's use results in a likelihood of
confusion.34 Such confusion is dependent upon the impression that
the plaintiff in some way endorses the product in question.35 However, some advertisements use a person's identity simply to call attention to the product without actually implying an endorsement.3"
The mere association by appearance of the person achieves the advertiser's purpose, which is to draw attention to the ad. 37 The result
was that the appropriator could freely exploit a person's identity
without worry because the person could not establish an unfair competition case.
Thus, Nimmer's article recognized and supported the need for a
right of publicity independent of privacy, trademark, and copyright
31. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203
(1954).
32. Id. at 204. An invasion of privacy action does not deal with commercial factors, only
with compensation for emotional impact.
33. Unfair competition claims are brought under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114
and 1125(a) (1988).
34. The right of publicity action has no likelihood of confusion requirement. See Rogers
v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
35. 15 USC. § 1114(a) (1988).
36. Nimmer, supra note 31, at 212. "Publicity values of a person ... may be profitably
appropriated and exploited without the necessity of any implication that such person . . . is
connected with the exploitation undertaken by the appropriator." Nimmer, supra note 31, at
212.
37. Nimmer called these situations "tie ups." Nimmer, supra note 31, at 212.
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law, which would provide recovery for the commercial value of an
unauthorized appropriation of identity for advertising purposes.

8

Furthermore, he advocated expansion of the concept to include a
greater realm of protected aspects in one's identity."9 Over the ensu-

ing years, Nimmer's analysis and rationale was applied and tested by
the courts.'"
The right received additional support in -1960 as a result of an
influential article by Gordon. 1 The article acknowledged and analyzed the trouble courts had in distinguishing the right to privacy
and the right of publicity.' 2 Gordon stressed the emotional versus
economic nature of the injuries that result, noting that the right of
publicity is the right to be free from commercial exploitation rather
than the right to privacy.' 3 This analysis was accepted by many

courts as the basis for recognizing the right of publicity as an independent action.
A related concept came from thelegal scholar Kalven. He noted
that the rationale for recognizing the right of publicity is "the

straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of
good will [associated with the plaintiff]. No social purpose is served

by having the defendant get [for] free some aspect of the plaintiff
that would have market value and for which he would normally
pay."" This phrase was later quoted with approval by the United
States Supreme Court in its decision recognizing the right of
publicity.'

Dean Prosser also had a significant impact on the shaping of the
right of publicity. Although not all commentators agree that the ef38. Nimmer, supra note 31, at 204.
39. Nimmer, supra note 31, at 222.
40. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, In:., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
1983), discussed infra notes 110-25 and accompanying text.
41. Harold R. Gordon, Rights of Property in Name, Likeness, Personalityand History,
55 Nw. U. L. REV. 553, 554 (1960).
42. Id. Gordon noted that:
[M]uch of the confusion and conflict in the decisions arose because litigants
chose to sue in almost every case for invasion of privacy (premised on injury to
feelings), rather than for the appropriation for commercial exploitation of property rights in name, likeness, etc., in situations where injury to feelings has only
secondary application.
Id.
43. Id. at 555. "[I]t
is property which is involved rather than privacy." Id. at 607.
44. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law. Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROaS. 326, 331 (1966). The recognition and protection of the "goodwill"
associated with a celebrity's personality has been continually recognized by the courts. See,
e.g., Grant v. Esquire, 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
45. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). For a
discussion of Zacchini, see infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
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fect was positive,' 6 it undeniably influenced the current state of the
right. Prosser wrote a law review article that evaluated and broke
down the right to privacy into four discrete actions: intrusion, disclosure, false light, and appropriation.' 7 It is the fourth action,
"[a]ppropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness"' 8 that has become associated so closely with the
right of publicity.' 9
Prosser limited his discussion to the plaintiff's name or likeness.
He noted that it is only the defendant's use of these characteristics
as a "symbol of [the plaintiff's] identity" that is actionable.5 0 Thus,
Prosser recognized the proprietary nature of a person's interest in
their identity. 1 This recognition is at least somewhat contradictory.
However, it utilizes a privacy-based action that provides compensation only for emotional damages to recognize the right to compensation for lost commercial value. 2 Prosser's theory of a privacy-based
right of publicity limited to name or likeness has been followed by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts"5 and several states.5 ' Thus,
while the 1960s saw advancement and support for the right of publicity by legal commentators, no great advancements were made by
the courts. 55 Judicial changes did not follow until the next decade.
46. See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity. An Answer
to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964).
47. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) [hereinafter
Prosser].
48. See id. at 406.
49. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § I.5[D]. For a complete discussion of
Prosser's first three categories of privacy actions, see MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at §§ 1.5[A]1.5[C].
50. Prosser, supra note 47, at 403. Prosser noted that the use of a name, in and of itself,
would not be actionable. "Anyone may call himself Dwight D. Eisenhower . . . without any
liability whatsoever," providing the use was not intended to capitalize on the plaintiff's identity
for the defendant's benefit. Prosser, supra note 47, at 403.
51. "The celebrity can undoubtedly complain of the [unauthorized] appropriation of his
identity for the purposes of advertising, or the sale of a product." Prosser, supra note 47, at
415.
52. See supra note 9.
53. "One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is
subject to liability for invasion of privacy." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C
(1977). It is worth noting that the Restatement was adopted well before many decisions which
have held that the right of publicity is an action independent of the right to privacy. See, e.g.,
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
54. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989); see
infra note 84 for text of statute.
55. A Georgia court did recognize the difference between actions for publicity and privacy and noted the commercial rather than emotional injuries which result. See Cabaniss v.
Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
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of the Right of

The 1970s witnessed a surge in the number of cases and decisions on the right of publicity, 56 prompting commentators to note
that the action came of age during this decade.5' Many cases recognized the right of publicity as a separate right from privacy,58 alleviating some of the confusion that hampered recognition in the preceding years. 9 Other jurisdictions continued to view the action as part
of the invasion of privacy action outlined by Prosser.6 ° Despite these
divergent views, a consistent recognition and expansion of the right
to publicity emerged in the 1970s and foreshadowed the direction of
the law in the following decade.
A.

Protection Expanded to the Persona as a Whole

A Minnesota District Court added strong support for the right
of publicity. The court in Uhlaender v. Henrickson6 l held that a celebrity's implicit waiver of privacy did not constitute a waiver of
publicity rights.6 2 The court further recognized the right of publicity
as a property right 6" subject to protection from unauthorized exploitation, stating that "a celebrity has a legitimate proprietary interest in his public personality. ' 64 The court demonstrated its progressive thinking by protecting, at least implicitly, characteristics of
56. Many of the cases brought in this period dealt with the issue of whether there is a
post mortem right of publicity. See, e.g., Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339
(D.N.J. 1981); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Martin
Luther King, Jr. Center v. American Heritage Products, 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1962).
Although discussion of descendibility is beyond the scope of this Comment, it has been
extensively discussed by other authors. See, e.g., J. Graham Matherne, Descendibility of Publicity Rights in Tennessee, 53 TENN. L. REv. 753 (1986); Timothy P. Tenell and Jane S.
Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptua' and Economic Analysis of
the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. (1985); Linda Winer, Who Owns the Dear Departed,
NEWSDAY, March 4, 1988, WEEKEND Section, at 2.
57. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1.10[A], at 1-40.
58. See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henrickson, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1280 (D. Minn. 1970) (calling the right of publicity a "distinctly independent tort"); accord Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
59. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
60. New York, for example, vacillated on the issue before ruling in 1984 that the action
lay solely within the New York privacy statute. See Stephano v. News Group Publications,
Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984). For a discussion of Prosser's privacy-oriented action, see
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
61. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
62. Id.
63. The court specifically defined the commercial value in one's identity as "a type of
property." Id. at 1282.
64. Id.

RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

one's persona in addition to name or likeness."5 Explicit support for
this concept came four years later.
1. Uniquely Distinguishing Aspects of Persona That Evoke
Identity.-Expansion of the right of publicity to include features of
one's persona was solidified in the landmark case Motschenbacher v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.6 6 Lothar Motschenbacher was an inter-

nationally known professional race car driver.6 7 In order to set his
cars apart from the other racers' cars and make his cars readily

identifiable, Motschenbacher consistently individualized the appearance of his cars. 8 The three main attributes that differentiated a
Motschenbacher car were its solid red paint-job, narrow white pinstripe,69 and Motschenbacher's racing number "11" painted on a
white oval background.7
Motschenbacher brought suit against R.J. Reynolds after a
Winston cigarette advertisement centered on a slightly modified picture of Motschenbacher's signature race car. 1 Motschenbacher was
not physically visible in the modified picture.72. The district court
characterized the action as one for invasion of privacy 73 and granted
summary judgment in favor of R.J. Reynolds because the "likeness"
of the driver was unrecognizable.7 4 The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the district court's focus on the driver's physical identifiability was misplaced.7 5 While the court of appeals agreed the
"likeness" of the driver was unrecognizable, it noted that:
ITihe [district] court's further conclusion of law that the driver
65. Id.
66. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
67. Id. at 822.
68. Id.
69. No other race car during the relevant period included a similar pinstripe. See id.
70. All of the other cars had square backgrounds for their racing numbers. See id.
71. The vehicle pictured in the advertisement was Motschenbacher's car with three minor modifications:
(a) an aerodynamic spoiler had been added to the rear of the car with the word
"Winston" painted on it;
(b) the number "I I" was changed to "71" and
(c) the names of other sponsors were removed.
The red paint-job, white pinstriping, and white background oval were all retained. Motschenbacher v. R.I. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 822 (9th Cir. 1974).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. The District Court felt that because Motschenbacher had not been directly identified
as the driver, his action failed. See id. 823 n.2.
75. Id. at 827. The court distinguished an earlier case in which a picture of a race car
was found not to identify the driver. See Branson v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 124 F. Supp.
429 (E.D. Ill. 1954). In fact, several witnesses testified that they thought it was Motschenbacher in the advertisement. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 827.
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is not identifiable as plaintiff [Motschenbacher] is erroneous in
that it wholly fails to attribute proper significance to the distinctive decorations appearing on the car [that] were not only peculiar to the plaintiff's cars but [which] caused some persons to
think the car in question was plaintiff's and to infer that the
76
person driving the car was the plaintiff.

The court of appeals held that "uniquely distinguishing fea-

tures" 77 of one's persona deserve the same protection as one's name
or likeness as a means of identifying the person. 8 The court recognized that the defendant clearly intended to evoke Motschenbacher's
persona and expanded the right of publicity to protect against such
infringement. In retrospect, this decision represented a quantum leap
79
toward the modern view of the right of publicity.
Further support was added to the expanded persona concept by
a New York court in Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernach, Inc.80
The plaintiff was the famous band leader Guy Lombardo. Lombardo
had become known to the public as "Mr. New Year's Eve" because
of his historical association with playing events on that occasion. 8
Lombardo and the defendant had been negotiating for Lombardo to
appear in one of the defendant's television commercials playing
Lombardo's theme song, "Auld Lang Syne."8 2 When an agreement
could not be reached, the defendant shot the commercial with an
actor who imitated Lombardo's well known gestures and musical
83
style.
Lombardo sued to recover damages for the unauthorized commercial use of his identity and persona.8" The court noted the forty
76. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. The defendant's intent was a factor in the court's decision to expand the right of
publicity's coverage. Compare with Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
discussed infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
80. 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
81. Id.
82. See generally id. The commercial was for a new model of car and wanted to stress
the New Year's connection. To complete the "Mr. New Year's Eve" persona, the band members were to wear party hats and the set was to be filled with balloons. Id.
83. Lombardo was known for his specific directing technique and the resulting musical
style he evoked from his band. Id.
84. Lombardo brought suit under the New York privacy statute and for appropriation of
his personality for commercial use. However, the court dismissed the privacy claim, noting
that the statute was limited to "name, portrait, or picture." See generally Lombardo v. Doyle,
Dane & Bernach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
New York Civil Rights Law § 50 provides:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait, or picture of any living person without having
first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her

RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

years over which Lombardo had "carefully and painstakingly built

[his] public personality" and determined that Lombardo's personality had commercial value.

5

The court recognized Lombardo's "legit-

imate proprietary interest" in protecting his established persona and
determined that the defendant's use of the New Year's setting and
intentional imitation of Lombardo's style was a commercial exploitation of his persona. 86 Once again, the defendant's clear intention to
infringe was a factor in the court's decision to expand the right of
'publicity to include the style and mannerisms associated with the

plaintiff.
2. Nicknames and Related Surroundings That Evoke Identity.-A New York District Court continued this line of reasoning in
Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.87 The defendant magazine published a drawing
of a nude black man sitting in the corner of a boxing ring with his
hands taped and his arms outstretched on the ropes.8 8 Although the
caption referred to the subject as "Mystery Man," the text included
the phrase "The Greatest."89 The internationally-known professional

boxer Muhammad Ali brought suit.
The court concluded that the combination of the boxing setting
and textual reference to Ali's nickname resulted in a clear identifica-

tion of Ali, despite the fact that neither his name nor likeness was
specifically used." The court therefore held that the defendant had
parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989). New York Civil Rights Law §
51 provides, in pertinent part:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purpose of trade without the written consent first obtained as above provided [in section 50] may maintain an action in the supreme
court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using his name,
portrait Or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof, and may also sue and
recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in
such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the last section, the
jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages.
Id. § 51. This view is still valid in New York. See Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc.,
474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984).
85. Lombardo, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664. This decision represented early judicial recognition
that a defendant may be unjustly enriched when the defendant obtains the goodwill and commercially exploitable value that the person has invested time and money in developing.
86. Id. In so doing, the court recognized the separate causes of action for publicity and
privacy. Id.
87. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
88. Id. at 726.
89. Id. This phrase was widely-known .to the general public as the nickname of Muhammad Ali. Id.
90. Id. Compare with Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th
Cir. 1974), discussed supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
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wrongfully appropriated the commercial value Ali developed and

owned in his public persona.91 Again, identifiability resulted from
factors related to the plaintiff's persona, but which were far more
abstract than name or likeness.
A similar case expanding the protected persona based upon a
nickname was Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.92 Plaintiff was a
famous college and professional football star who developed the nick-

name "Crazylegs" as a result of his unique running style.93 A
"Crazylegs" cheer was developed for Hirsch during college and, dur-

ing his professional career, Hirsch made several commercials in
which he was identified by his "Crazylegs" nickname. 94 Hirsch
brought suit when defendant marketed a women's shaving gel named
"Crazylegs" and aired a commercial incorporating a version of the
"Crazylegs" cheer. 5
The court in Hirsch explicitly noted the sepatrate nature of privacy and publicity claims. 96 The court then ruled that unauthorized
use of one's well-known nickname was actionable as an unauthorized
use of one's proper name under the right of publicity.97 Thus, the
court reinforced previous holdings that a person may have their identity commercially misappropriated without specific use of name or
likeness. 98 These rulings were pivotal in future actions.
B. The United States Supreme Court Recognizes the Right of
Publicity
The most powerful precedent for the right of publicity is the

United States Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co.9 9 Although factually dissimilar to previ91. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
92. 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
93. Id. at 131. Hirsch achieved All-American status at the University of Michigan. As a
result of his perennial selections to the All-Pro Team during his career with the Los Angeles
Rams, Hirsch earned a place on the All Time All-Pro Team for the first 50 years of professional football. See id.
94. Id. at 132. In addition, there was a movie based upon Hirsch's life entitled
"Crazylegs All American." Id.
95. Id. at 129. The defendant corporation also promoted the product through running
events, alluding to the source of Hirsch's nickname. See id.
96. Id. at 134.
97. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (Wis. 1979). Hirsch was
only required to prove that the "Crazylegs" nickname identified him to the public and that he
suffered damages based on his loss or defendant's unjust enrichment. Id. at 140.
98. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974),
discussed supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text; Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), discussed supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
99. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). Zacchini is, to date, the only case involving the right of publicity decided by the Supreme Court.
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ous right of publicity cases, the decision clearly expresses the Supreme Court's recognition and approval of the right of publicity. 100
The Zacchini case revolved around a constitutional issue:
whether the press is immunized under the First Amendment from
having to pay a performer for reproducing his entire live performance on the local news without the performer's authorization.' The
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment afforded no such
protection and that the station should pay damages to Zacchini. 02
The importance of the Zacchini decision lies in the fact that the
Supreme Court continually referred to the right of publicity as a
recognized and established legal principle.' 03 The Court further distinguished the right of publicity as an entirely different tort from
invasion of privacy, 04 thereby accepting the views set forth by Nimmer and Kalven.
The Court likened state-law rights of publicity to trademark
and copyright law because they all create a protectable "economic
incentive" for performers to make the "investment required" to produce a performance of public interest. 0 5 Although some commentators have questioned this comparison on federal preemption
grounds, 0 6 the Court specifically noted that "[t]he Constitution does
not prevent [a state from] deciding to protect the entertainer's
incentive."'' 7
Even though the Court's holding was limited to the unique facts
of the case, the impact of the decision cannot be doubted. The
Zacchini decision gave the right of publicity something it had previously been lacking - respectability. As one commentator noted:
[TIhe mere fact that the United States Supreme Court favorably mentioned the Right of Publicity was alone enough to attract attention and spark interest among those who had never
before heard of such a "right." . . . The Right of Publicity had
its day in the glare of public attention on the stage of the high100. In particular, the Court emphasized its support for states' right of publicity law. Id.
at 573.
101. Id. Zacchini was a "human cannonball." He was shot approximately 200 feet from
a cannon for a total of approximately 15 seconds. A local Ohio television station videotaped
the performance, showing it in its entirety on the eleven-o'clock news. Zacchini sued the television station for damages resulting from the station's unauthorized reproduction of his performance. See id. at 562.
102. Id.
103. See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1.10[B], at 1-43.
104. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 (1977).
105. Id. at 563.
106. See, e.g., David E. Shipley, Publicity Never Dies: It Just Fades Away: The Right
of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 673 (1981).
107. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
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est court in the land and had defeated the weighty first amendment of the Constitution. After the Zacchini case, everyone took
the Right of Publicity more seriously. 10 8

The Supreme Court's support made way for further recognition and
expansion in the right of publicity. The 1980s would see a number of
precedent setting cases and a dramatic increase in the number of
actions.
V.

The Current State of the Right of Publicity

Modern development of the right to publicity ias seen further
expansion of the persona in toto concept. The cases demonstrate a
clear trend toward protecting a person's style and characteristics
even when the person's actual name or likeness is not used. The
courts have continued to view the defendants' intent as a significant
factor.
A.

Identity Expanded to Include Closely-Related Phrases

An influential case was Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.10 The well-known entertainer Johnny Carson was the
plaintiff in this case. 110 The defendant manufactured portable toilets
and used the phrase "Here's Johnny" as both a corporate name and
in connection with the sale and rental of its product."' One of the
claims Carson made against the defendant was invasion of his right
of publicity. " 2 The district court dismissed Carson's claim, holding
that the phrase did not constitute a name or likeness meriting protection under the right of publicity.11 3 The court of appeals reversed,
however, finding that the district court had interpreted the right to
publicity action too narrowly. "
Carson had been introduced by and directly associated with the
108. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1.10B], at 1-44.
109. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
110. Carson was the long-time host of The Tonight Show and president of Johnny Carson Apparel, Inc. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 832. Carson also sued for trademark infringement and invasion of his right to
privacy. The privacy action failed and Carson never registered thfc phrase "Here's Johnny" as
either a trademark or service mark. Id. Accordingly, both of these additional claims were
ultimately dismissed. Id.
113. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 71, 77 (E.D.
Mich. 1980) (district court opinion). The court viewed name or likeness in the narrowest possible context to mean either the proper name or an actual picture of the person. See Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983).
114. Carson, 698 F.2d at 835.
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phrase "Here's Johnny" for twenty-six years." 5 The defendant admitted that he knew the phrase had long been used to introduce Carson and stipulated that the public tends to associate the phrase
"Here's Johnny" with Carson." 6 The defendant further admitted in
a deposition that, absent such direct identification with Carson, the
defendant would not have used the phrase to promote his product. " 7
The court held that a person's right of publicity "is invaded whenever his identity is intentionally appropriated for commercial purposes" without the person's permission." 8 Thus, the issue turned on
whether the defendant's use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" was an

appropriation of Carson's identity for commercial purposes.
The defendant's undisputed intent factored into the court's deci-

sion. The court of appeals concluded that "the proof showed without
question that the defendant had appropriated Carson's identity in
connection with its corporate name and product.""' 9 The court noted
that a celebrity's identity can be appropriated in various ways, including a phrase closely related to the person. 2 0 In so doing, the

court followed the courts' holdings in Motschenbacher,'2 1 Ali,' and
Hirsch' that a right of publicity action need not be limited merely
24
to appropriation of name or likeness.
The continuing recognition that personal traits and associated
factors are protected elements of one's persona played an important
role in several significant decisions to follow. Rather than centering
on purely visual imitation, however, the modern emphasis seems to
be on aural or audio-visual imitation. Today's advertisers use imitators of actual celebrities to imply endorsement or gain the public's

attention. Imitations have taken the form of look-alikes in television
and print media and sound-alikes on radio and off-camera television
115. Id. at 836. The phrase "Here's Johnny" had continually been Carson's signature
introduction on The Tonight Show.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983)
(emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
124. A dissent by Justice Kennedy differentiated these cases, stating that a right of publicity action for appropriation of one's identity should not extend beyond "an individual's
name, likeness, achievements, identifying characteristics, or actual performances." See Carson
v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). However, even this characterization of the action's scope demonstrates an expansion
beyond previous boundaries of name or likeness.
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voice-overs. Such actions have brought their own need for interpretation and expansion of the right of publicity.' 25
B.

Identity Expanded to Include Vocal Style and Artistic Persona
In what will likely prove to be the precedent for the 1990s,'

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded the right of publicity
to cover appropriation of a person's voice in Mfdler v. Ford Motor

Co. "27
' The court in Midler effectively nullified an eighteen year old
precedent that had precluded actions by plaintiffs alleging voice

sound-alike infringement.' 28
The plaintiff was the singer/actress Bette Midler.' 29 Ford Motor Co. was planning an advertising campaign aimed at middle-aged
car buyers.130 The campaign was designed to evoke nostalgic memories by using original artists singing their big hits from the target

audience's college days.'

Ford solicited Midler to sing her 1973 hit

"Do You Want to Dance,"' 32 but Midler flatly rejected the offer.' 33
125. Part of the problem has developed because of the differences in right of publicity
law among jurisdictions. Depending on the state, the right of publicity is based upon either: (a)
common law exclusively; (b) combination of common law and cumulative statute; or (c) statutory law exclusively. By definition, those states with some form of right based on common law
can adapt to changing times through judicial decisions, while purely statutory states await
legislative action. For a thorough breakdown of states in terms of these categories, see Leonard
A. Wohl, Note, The Right of Publicity: Sounding Off on Sound Alikes, 57 FORDHAM L.
REVIEW 445, 450-51 n.53 (1988).
126. The right of publicity's most noted commentator has referred to the decision as
starting "a new era of judicial attitude and analysis." See MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §
4.14[C], at 4-89.
127. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). Ford was actually dismissed as a defendant and
judgment was entered against the advertising agency, Young & Rubicam. This case is of great
importance because it is the first time the right has been extended to include voice, despite the
fact that several other courts had the opportunity to do so. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 40.2 U.S. 906 (1970); Booth v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). While one plaintiff had limited
success on a similar claim, he did so under an unfair competition/false advertising claim. See
Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (lst Cir. 1962).
128. See Sinatra, 435 F.2d 711. The facts of Sinatra are remarkably similar to Midler.
Nancy Sinatra sued Goodyear over its unauthorized use of a sound-alike imitation of her hit
song "These Boots are Made for Walking" in its radio and television advertisements for Goodyear "Wide Boots" tires. Id. at 712. Goodyear had solicited Sinatra to re-record her song for
the commercial, but no agreement could be reached by the parties. Id. at 713. Goodyear then
hired an imitator to sing and dress like Sinatra for the commercial. Id. at 712. The court
dismissed Sinatra's action for various reasons. Id.
129. Midler's recordings have been tremendously successful and have repeatedly "gone
Platinum and Gold." Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988). Midler
won a Grammy for her 1973 album "The Divine Miss M" anc. was nominated for the Best
Female Actress Academy Award for her leading role in the 1979 movie The Rose. Id. Time
magazine called Midler "a legend" and "the most poignant singer-actress of her time." Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. Ford dubbed the advertisements "The Yuppie Campaign" after its intended
affluent audience. Id.
132. The song "Do You Want to Dance" was the big hi. from Midler's grammy-win-
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Instead of choosing another artist and song, Ford's advertising
agency134 hired a singer to imitate Midler and instructed her to
"sound as much as possible like the Bette Midler record[ing]" of the
song.1 35 Midler did not own the copyright to the song and did not
contest Ford's licensed use of the song."3 ' Rather, Midler asserted

37
that Ford had improperly stolen her particular style and voice.
The court recognized that a person's vocal style is part of that
person's identity.' 38 "A voice is as distinctive and as personal as a

face . . . . To impersonate [Midler's] voice is to pirate her identity. 1' 3 9 The court then held that "when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order
to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and
have committed a tort" under the right of publicity. 40 Clearly, the
court focused on Ford's intent to imitate Midler in reaching its
decision.
The court called Ford's conduct that "of an average thief' and
awarded Midler $400,000."'1 Beyond overruling adverse precedent," 2' the Midler court provided judicial recognition that the personal combination of voice and style that comprises an artistic perning album "The Divine Miss M." Id.
133. Midler had a strong policy against doing any endorsements and had refused all
previous offers. See id. The phone conversation between Ford and Midler's agent exemplifies
Midler's firm anti-endorsement policy:
Hello, I am Craig Hazen from Young & Rubicam. I am calling to find out if
Bette Midler would be interested in doing...
Is it a commercial?
Yes.
We are not interested.
Id.
134. Ford hired Young & Rubicam for the promotion. Young & Rubicam was also
named as a party to the suit, and in fact was the party against whom the judgment was
actually entered after Ford was dismissed as a defendant. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d
460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988).
135. Id. The singer chosen, Ula Hedwig, happened to be one of Midler's back-up singers
who had been with Midler for years and was clearly capable of mimicking Midler's voice and
style. Id.
136. Id. at 462. Although Midler was not the sole artist to record the song "Do You
Want to Dance," her version is the best known. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 462.
139. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 852 (5th ed. 1984)). The court also noted that
"a voice is more distinctive and more personal than the automobile accoutrements protected in
Motschenbacher." Id.
140. Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 462.
142. Although the court technically differentiated rather than overruled the Sinatra precedent, the Midler decision effectively nullified the Sinatra case and thus achieved the same
result.
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sona is a valuable and protectable property right.' 43 This recognition
served as the basis for other sound-alike claims brought by entertain-

ers whose artistic style was allegedly imitated in a commercial
context.
VI.
A.

Recent Procedural and Remedial Developments
Parody Defense Ineffective
In a recent case, the court in Tin Pan Apple v. Miller Brewing

Co., Inc.,'"1 combined elements of many previous actions and theories"15 in order to award damages for alleged appropriation of persona or identity. 146 The plaintiffs were Mark Morales, Darren
Robinson, and Damon Wimbley, better known as the rap group the
"Fat Boys."" 7 Plaintiffs brought suit for the defendants' unauthorized commercial use of the Fat Boys' persona.
Defendant Miller Brewing Company ran an advertising campaign in which comedian Joe Piscopo assumed a number of different
identities to endorse Miller beer.148 In the advertisement at issue,
Piscopo assumed the role of a very fat rap musician dressed like the
Fat Boys. 14 Piscopo was backed by three Fat Boys look-alikes performing in the distinctly recognizable Fat Boys persona. 6 0 Miller
143. Patrick Goldstein, Pop Eye: Waits - Is Frito a Bandito?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23,
1988, at 85.
144. 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Tin Pan Apple is the owner of the Fat Boys'
registered service mark and copyright owner of most of the Fat Boys' recordings. Id. Additional plaintiffs included the Fat Boys as individuals, Sutra Records, Inc., and Fool's Prayer
Music, Inc., which owned various copyrights to Fat Boys' recordings. Id. Additional defendants included comedian Joe Piscopo, an actor in the commercial at issue, and Backer &
Spielvogel, Inc., the advertising firm that created the commercial. Id.
145. Only two causes of action are germane to this Comment: an action for look-alike
infringement of right of publicity and an action for sound-alike infringement of right of publicity. Both actions were brought under New York's Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51. See supra
note 84 for statutory language.
The amended complaint asserted seven causes of action in addition to the publicity claims
causes of action: two for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (Supp. 1992)
and 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125(a) (1988); two for Lanham Act violations of false advertising and unfair competition; one for violation of New York's General Business Law; one for
trade libel and disparagement; one for libel per se. The latter two actions were dismissed pursuant to Miller's 12(b)(6) motion.
146. Interestingly, this is a case in which the plaintiffs sued for the appropriation of
their well-known professional identity, but where virtually no one would know their real
names.
147. Tin Pan Apple, 737 F. Supp. 826. "Rapping" is defined by the court as "spoken or
semi-sung rhyming verse recited over a powerful rhythm track created by drums and drum
sounds; it is lyrics over an almost exclusively percussion-based rmelody." Id.
148. The commercials ran nationally on television and other media. Id. at 828.
149. See Tin Pan Apple v. Miller Brewing Co., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
150. Id. The Fat Boys' distinctive persona consists of three "overweight, young singers
who create a melody for their songs by vocal sounds rather than instruments and who consist-
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had contacted the real Fat Boys about appearing in the commercial,

but the Fat Boys rejected Miller's offer.' 5 ' The advertising agency
then advertised for imitators 5 and hired three imitators "bear[ing]
a striking resemblance to

. .

.each of the three fat Black males con-

'153
stituting the Fat Boys.
Miller moved for dismissal,154 relying primarily upon the de-

fense that the commercial constituted parody and the imitation
therefore constituted fair use.' 55 The court, after lengthy discussion
and citation, denied the motion and quashed Miller's parody defense.' 5 " The court noted the United States Supreme Court's recent
statement that a defendant's appropriation for commercial purposes

acts as a factor militating against fair use.'"" The court stated that a
true parody must convey two simultaneous and yet contradictory
messages: "that the imitation is the original, but also that it is not
the original and is instead a parody. To the extent that it does only

the former but not the latter, it is not only a poor parody but also
ently appear before the public wearing square studded eyeglasses, T-shirts, striped sneakers,
satin baseball jackets, and large, gold name pendants around their necks." Id. at 833. The
imitators copied these physical characteristics and the performance style. Id.
151. Id. at 828. Like O'Brien, the Fat Boys were concerned not only because of the loss
of income, but because they were all underage and had specifically spoken-out against underage consumption of alcohol. Id. For a discussion of O'Brien, see supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
152. The defendants "publicly advertised for three fat Black males to appear in [its]
commercial." Tin Pan Apple, 737 F. Supp. at 835.
153. Id. Two of the Fat Boys are African American and one is African American-Hispanic with significantly lighter skin tone. Of the three overweight imitators hired, defendants
specifically selected two African American males and one African American-Hispanic male
for the parts. Furthermore, discovery produced evidence that the defendants purchased Fat
Boys' videos prior to shooting of the commercial in order to study the group's style and appearance. In fact, the imitation Fat Boys in the commercial are dressed almost exactly like the real
Fat Boys as they appear on the cover of the video which the advertisers purchased. Telephone
Interview with Scott Martin, Esquire, of Richards & O'Neil, New York City, attorneys for the
Fat Boys (Oct. 2, 1990).
154. Miller moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) FED. R. Civ. P., failure to
state a claim for which relief could be granted. Tin Pan Apple v. Miller Brewing Co., Inc., 737
F. Supp. 826, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
155. Id. at 829. The parody defense asserted by Miller stems most notably from the
United States Supreme Court case Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
In that case, Hustler magazine published an unflattering caricature of the Reverend Jerry
Falwell regarding his sexual experience. Falwell sued under various theories, but the Supreme
Court ultimately held that the use (or misuse) of Falwell's identity was clearly parody and not
actionable. See generally id. This logic has been extended to expand the fair use doctrine in
copyright and trademark claims. For a discussion of the fair use doctrine, see, e.g., Warner
Brothers, Inc. v. American Broadcasting, Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983); Elsmere
Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Berlin v.
E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
156. Tin Pan Apple, 737 F. Supp. at 833.
157. Id. at 832 (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984) and Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)).
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vulnerable" to an action by the original. 158
Furthermore, it is well established that commercial expression is
held to a higher standard than non-commercial expression.1"9 When
taken as a whole, the court found that Miller's commercial merely
conjured-up the Fat Boys without actually creating a parody.' 60
Thus, Miller's parody defense failed and the commercial was held to
be an actionable appropriation of the Fat Boys persona.' 6' The court
described Miller's actions as "bad faith raised to a higher power"1 62
and focused on the defendant's intent as a detercminative factor in
the ruling.
On the surface, the Tin Pan Apple decision merely states that
the Fat Boys may have a cause of action and must be allowed the
opportunity to present their case. 6 3 However, the effect of the decision is far reaching. Rather than a quick denial of the dismissal motions, the court took the time to draft a lengthy opinion in which it
presented extensive discussion and citation.' 6 ' The court sent a message that the Fat Boys not only have an actionable claim, but also a
strong case.
The court all but ruled for the Fat Boys on thie look-alike claim.
The court cited authority that the defendant's deliberate seeking out
and use of look-alikes was banned by New York's strict statute, despite the fact that the plaintiff's name was not used. 165 "An exact
duplication of plaintiff was not necessary to make out a cause of
1

158. Id. at 834 (quoting Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing, Inc.,
886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989)).
159. Tin Pan Apple v. Miller Brewing Co., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 826, 833 n.I (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980)).
160. Id. at 834.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 835.
163. Id. at 826.
164. See generally Tin Pan Apple v. Miller Brewing Co., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 826
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
165. Id. at 837. The court noted that the strict construction-oriented decisions which
required the actual use of name or pictures are dated. See. e.g., Woltowicz v. Delacorte Press,
403 N.Y.S.2d 218 (N.Y. 1978). More recent decisions have advocated a broader reading of
the statutory language and intent, thereby allowing actions even without actual use of name or
photograph. See, e.g., Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1984), affd, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
In the Onassis case, defendant manufacturer had full knowledge that Ms. Onassis would
not consent to doing an advertisement. Undaunted, defendant retained a look-alike service to
obtain as close an imitation of Ms. Onassis as possible for an advertisement. Accordingly, the
court allowed the action under the statute. See generally id.; see also Allen v. Men's World
Outlet, 679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). Interestingly, the look-alike service retained by Dior was Ron Smith Celebrity Look-Alikes, which has been a defendant in several other look-alike actions in New York
over recent years, including the Woody Allen cases noted above.
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action under the statute, so long as the overall impression created
clearly was that the plaintiff had . . . appeared in the advertisement.1 6 Thus, when an advertisement implies that the imitation is
the original and the imitation seems indistinguishable from the original, the court may hold that the representation is actionable as a
"portrait or picture" under the statute. 6 7 Nevertheless, Miller apparently decided to pursue the case rather than settle. 6 8
The court did, however, dismiss the Fat Boys' sound-alike

claim."6 9 The court's sole reason for dismissing the claim was deference to the legislature. 70 The court held "only that the New York
Civil Rights Law does not yet extend to sound-alikes."' 7' The use of

the word "yet" clearly implies the court's feeling that New York law
will be extended to cover voice and demonstrates the court's willing-

ness to recognize such an action. "' Thus, even the dismissal recognizes the trend expanding the right of publicity.
B.

Punitive Damages Available

Perhaps the most dramatic right of publicity suit in recent
times, and the first case to be tried directly under the Midler precedent,17 3 pitted country-western singer Tom Waits against Frito-Lay,
Inc. and its advertising firm, Tracy-Locke, Inc. 7 4 Waits brought suit
166. Tin Pan Apple, 737 F. Supp. at 837 (citing Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F.
Supp. 612).
167. Id. (citing Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612).
168. Telephone Interview with Scott Martin, Esquire, of Richards & O'Neil, New York
City, attorneys for the Fat Boys (Oct. 2, 1990). Mr. Martin stated that he was surprised that
Miller made no settlement overtures, given that the court soundly dismissed Miller's strongest
defense. Id.
169. Tin Pan Apple v. Miller Brewing Co., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 826, 838 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
170. The word "voice" appears nowhere in the statutory language. See supra note 85.
This omission was recognized as "possibly an oversight, since the possibility of reproducing
. . . the sound of a voice was not contemplated in 1903 when sections 50 and 51 of the Civil
Rights Law were first enacted." See Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d
254 (N.Y, Sup. Ct. 1984), afl'd, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). The Tin Pan
Apple court declined to correct this "oversight" of the New York Legislature. Tin Pan Apple,
737 F. Supp. at 837.
171. Tin Pan Apple, 737 F. Supp. at 837 (emphasis added). The court differentiated the
recent Midler decision because California law specifically extends to sound-alikes within the
statutory language "name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness." Id. (emphasis added).
172. In fact, the New York Legislature is currently considering a bill that would expand
the statute to include voice as a protected part of the persona along with name and likeness.
Scott Martin, How to Steer Clear of Sound-Alikes, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, June 18, 1990, at
30-31.
173. Paul Feldman, Tom Waits Wins $2
Million in Voice-Theft Suit, L.A. TIMES,
May 9, 1990, at BI.
174. The case, C.A. No. 88-06478, was decided May 8, 1990 in California District
Court after a four week trial. Unfortunately, there is no published opinion in this case, and
attempts to obtain any documentation were unsuccessful. As such, news articles provide the
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over a radio commercial for Frito's Salsa-Rio Doritos. 175 The comWaits' voice and style on an admercial utilized a singer imitating
76
product.1
the
for
jingle
vertising
Like Midler and the Fat Boys, Waits consistently rejected offers
to do commercial endorsements. 177 In this case, however, no efforts
were made to obtain Waits to do the commercial himself. 78 Instead,
there was evidence that the advertising agency intended to imitate
Waits' voice, style, and song-type from the outset.' 79 Thus, Waits
was especially surprised and angry to hear his "Iarynxization"'

80

be-

ing broadcast in what he termed a "corn chip sermon."''
The advertising agency hired a performer named Steve Carter
to imitate Waits for the Doritos jingle. 82 Carter imitated Waits for
a living in his stage act' and provided such a close imitation that

Waits himself characterized Carter as having studied his (Waits')
style "a little too close[ly].''

The jurors agreed after comparing

tapes of Waits to the commercial, stating that the "uniqueness of
'
Mr. Waits' voice speaks for itself."185
Although most of the jury' had never heard of Waits or his
music before the trial, 87 they awarded Waits nearly two and onehalf million dollars in damages for commercial misappropriation of
his voice and style.' 88 Aside from the sheer enormity of the award, it
sole source of information on the Waits case.
175. See Richard Harrington, The Music Industry's Court Hits, WASH. POST, May 30,
1990, at C7.
176. See id.
177. See Feldman, supra note 173.
178. See Feldman, supra note 173.
179. The evidence showed that while preparing the advertisement, the Tracy-Locke
copywriter repeatedly listened to "Step Right Up," a Tom Waits' song. Feldman, supra note
173. Furthermore, the copywriter played the song as part of his presentation to the executives
during the meeting at which the commercial was approved. Feldman, supra note 173. After
obtaining approval for the campaign, the advertising agency drafted a jingle based upon the
Waits' song and specifically sought out a Waits' impersonator. See Harrington, supra note
175.
180. See Harrington, supra note 175. Waits stated that the court's decision effectively
provided him with "a fence around [his] larynxization." See Harrington, supra note 175.
Waits coined this term to characterize his personal combination of voice, style, and inflection
which has been referred to as "gravel-throated" and "raspy." See Harrington, supra note 175.
181. See Harrington, supra note 175. The commercial at issue was broadcast by over
250 radio stations. Harrington, supra note 175.
182. Harrington, supra note 175.
183. Harrington, supra note 175.
184. See Feldman, supra note 173.
185. See Feldman, supra note 173.
186. The Los Angeles federal court jury consisted of six jurors instead of the traditional
twelve jurors. Feldman, supra note 173.
187. Feldman, supra note 173. Waits has never had a top ten hit although he has recorded seventeen albums over the past twenty years.
188. The damages actually totaled $2,475,000. Feldman, supra note 173.
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is of great legal importance since one and one-half million dollars of
the award constituted punitive damages. 189 Waits is the first right of

publicity case in which punitive damages have ever been awarded. 190
Again the defendant's clear intent served as the basis for the
expansion of the right of publicity law. The combined successes of

Midler and Waits have encouraged others to bring suit for misappropriation of style.' 9 '
VII.

The Need for Procedural Changes
The Waits decision continues the line of cases that expand and

further define the scope of the right of publicity and its remedies. As
such, the decision raises a number of questions and concerns regarding the future of right of publicity actions. In particular, the Waits
case demonstrates the need for increased consideration of the plaintiffs degree of fame and the courts' methods of damage calculation.
189. $1,000,000 of the punitive damages were assessed against Tracy-Locke, Inc. and
$500,000 were assessed against Frito-Lay, Inc. Feldman, supra note 173. The remainder of
the award was broken down as follows:
(a) $200,000 for personal suffering;
(b) $100,000 for compensation Waits would have received had he done the
advertisement;
(c) $100,000 for false advertising; and
(d) $75,000 for harm to Waits' reputation.
Harrington, supra note 175.
190. See Harrington, supra note 175. Although Bette Midler sought punitive damages
against Ford and Young & Rubicam, the court ruled out the possibility because the defendants had acted in reliance upon the previous Sinatra holding in which the court dismissed a
virtually identical action. See Felix H. Kent, Roundup of 1989, N.Y. LAW J., Jan. 3, 1990, at
3. For a discussion of the Midler case, see supra notes 127-44 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the Sinatra case, see supra note 128.
191. On October 15, 1990, well-known guitarist Carlos Santana filed suit in a California
District Court against Miller Brewing Company for intentional unauthorized commercial use
of his distinctive style on his signature song, "Black Magic Woman." Relying on Waits,
Santana sued for punitive damages. Jim Doyle, Carlos Santana Sues Over TV Ad, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Oct. 16, 1990, at A2.
"Wheel of Fortune" game show hostess Vanna White sued Samsung Electronics for unauthorized commercial appropriation of "attributes of her personality." See Paul Feldman, Tom
Waits Looking to Collect Some Chips in Suit, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1990, at B3. The television
commercial at issue featured a glamorously-dressed robot in a blond wig on a game show set.
Ms. White recently lost the case, although no opinion has been published. See Marcy Magiera,
Midler 'Sound Alike' Win Means Creative Changes, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 6, 1989, at 2.
Comedian Rodney Dangerfield sued Park Inns International for using a sound-alike in a
commercial promoting the hotel chain. Before the case went to trial, however, the parties settled. Id.
The estate of Bobby Darin sued McDonald's advertising agency Davis, Ball &
Colombatto for allegedly pirating Darin's distinctive stylistic version of "Mack the Knife" for
the "Mac Tonight" campaign. This case was pending at the time of this Comment's publication. See id.
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Degree of Fame as a Determinative Factor

The issue of fame or public awareness is a major concern after
recent decisions, especially Waits. The leading question seems to be:
How famous do you have to be to have an actionable right of publicity claim? The general view 6f commentators is that everyone has a
right of publicity, regardless of the degree of fame. 192 Even conceding the equal protection logic behind such a rule, however, the potential amount of recovery should be at least partially proportioned according to the degree of fame.
Tom Waits has never had a top ten hit, has produced only seventeen albums in the past twenty years, and neither he nor his music
were recognized by the jury before the trial. 19 3 This lack of familiarity did not stop the jury from awarding a two and one-half million
dollar award1" to the same performer who would have received only
one hundred thousand dollars had he actually done the commercial.195 Viewed in a relative context, Waits was awarded a minimum
of twenty-five times the value of his cortract for the alleged wrong.
Given that even unfair competition laws generally provide only for
treble damages,"9 ' the Waits award is clearly excessive.
The award was based partially on the grounds that Waits' commercial reputation was "besmirched' 9 7 by the advertisement. The
amount of the award therefore implies that Waits had both a significant commercial drawing power and that Frito-Lay's advertisement
was a major detriment to this drawing power. In reality, Waits has
little proven commercial reputation of which to speak.' 98 Waits himself recognized his lack of recording-star sales status. 9 Commentators noted that "Waits is more of a cult figure than a household
192. See

MCCARTHY,

supra note 2, at § 4.

193. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
194. By way of comparison, note the awards received by other performers for unauthorized commercial use of their identity:
Musical star John Lennon received $35,000 for damage to his reputation resulting from
defendant's use of Lennon's name on a "cheap looking" album of poor quality Lennon recordings. See Big Seven Music Corp. v. Lennon, 554 F.2d 504, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Columnist Heloise Bowles, of "Hints from Heloise" fame, received $75,000 resulting from
defendant's unauthorized use of Bowles' name to promote various household products. See
National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklce Corp., 503 F. Supp. 553 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
Singer/actress Cher was awarded $100,000 for the unauthorized use of her name and
picture in the promotion of Forum magazine. See Cher v. Forum International, Ltd., 213
U.S.P.Q. 96 (C.D. Cal. 1982), modified and aff'd, 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1120 (1983).
195. See supra note 189.
196. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (1988).
197. See Feldman, supra note 173.
198. See supra note 187.
199. See Feldman, supra note 173.
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name" 200 and have even suggested that Waits use his award money
to hire a good publicist because no one seems to know who he is. 201
By making the award proportional to the reputation and degree
of commercial value in the plaintiffis persona, this problem could be
avoided. Such a scheme would not treat anyone unfairly; the award
is supposed to be based on the improper commercial exploitation involved, and the bigger stars inherently have bigger commercial
value. Clearly, the commercial value of a figure who has maintained
fame over a period of decades, such as Johnny Carson, would be
worth more than someone who may have been around for decades,
but who has little commercial presence, such as Tom Waits.
Durability is not the sole factor for consideration, however; timing plays a major role as well. If an advertiser wants a person who is
currently popular, the advertiser must pay accordingly, despite the
fact that the same person may be a non-entity in terms of commercial value in a short period of time. Short-term fame is characteristic
of performers, and the advertiser wants to exploit the fame as of that
moment.20 2 Thus, an overnight success story may have a greater current commercial value than the long-term performer.
Tom Waits is neither a long-standing nor overnight success,
however. While this is not to say that his commercial value is nonexistent, it is certainly minimal and his award should reflect that.
Waits' fans have not made him dramatically wealthy.20 3 Therefore,
an award by a sympathetic jury logically should not have been able
to do so.
B.

Method of Identification as a Factor in Damage Calculation

A related concern revolves around the identification methods
used in the courtroom to prove a plaintiff's case. Since identifying
the plaintiff as the imitated party is the key to a right to publicity
case, the method of identification plays an important role.
Unaided identification requires the juror to recognize and identify the plaintiff as the person being imitated merely from viewing or
hearing the defendant's advertisement. 204 If the juror can view or
200. See Paul Feldman, Tom Waits Looking to Collect Some Chips in Suit, L.A. TIMES,
May I, 1990, at B3.
201. See Harrington, supra note 175.
202. By way of an extreme example, take Pizza Hut's current campaign featuring the
Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles. Clearly an endorsement from the Turtles is worth more at this
moment than perhaps any other "stars" in the public eye, despite the fact that such an endorsement is apt to have little long-term value.
203. See supra note 187.
204. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 3.4[B]. McCarthy coined the terms "unaided" and
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listen to the defendant's use and make the mental connection that
the plaintiff is being imitated, an unaided identification has taken
place.20 5 The process requires the juror to recognize the imitation by
virtue of comparison with a preexisting mental impression of the
20 6
plaintiff's persona.
Aided identification occurs when the juror is able to identify the
plaintiff as the party being imitated only after being exposed to and
comparing the commercial imitation with an example of the original.2 °7 The mental connection is made by virtue of comparing the
two samples provided, and the juror need not have recognized the
plaintiff's persona beforehand. 208 Although court; apparently do not
differentiate between the two methods, recent cases have been decided on the basis of aided identification. 20 Analysis of the underlying principle of the right of publicity, however, demonstrates that
unaided identification should be adopted.
The right of publicity protects the commercial value in one's
public persona. The greater one's public recognition, the greater the
inherent commercial value in that person's identity. Therefore, compensation for commercial use of one's persona and related loss upon
unauthorized use is directly proportional to that persona's degree
and ease of recognition. Logically, the amount of potential recovery
should be so related. Unfortunately, this has not proven to be the
case.
For example, in Waits, Tom Waits was a relative unknown.21 0
Outside of his limited following, it is reasonable to assume that few
people heard Frito's commercial and assumed that the voice was either Tom Waits' or an imitation of him. 21 1 The Waits' persona thus
yields little commercial value and should have limited any potential
award accordingly. The reason it did not affect the award was because the court used aided identification. 1 2
The jurors did not have to determine whether Frito's commer"aided" identification in the context of the right of publicity.
205. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 3.4[B].
206. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 3.4[B].
207. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 3.4[B].
208. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 3.4[B].
209. In both Midler and Waits, the jury made their determination by comparing the
defendant's commercial to a sample of the plaintiff's version of the song in question.
210. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
211. The jurors admitted that they could not have done so. See supra note 179 and
accompanying text.
212. The jurors compared a tape of Waits to the voice on the commercial in order to
decide that the latter was an imitation of the former. See supra note 185 and accompanying
text.
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cial was an imitation of Waits' voice and style. Rather, they only
had to decide whether Frito's usage was similar to the numerous
Waits' recordings provided by plaintiff's counsel. Under these circumstances, the jury is likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff even in
a questionable case. Given the underlying rationale of the right of
publicity and the fact that the plaintiff is supposed to carry the burden, such an aided comparison is clearly biased in favor of the
plaintiff.2" 3
By using unaided identification, the court could quickly establish the plaintiff's degree of identifiability and resulting degree of
commercial value. After all, the defendant's alleged reason for imitating the plaintiff is to capitalize on the plaintiff's identifiability.
The plaintiff's job. is to prove that the defendant so imitated the
plaintiff. If plaintiffs cannot carry this burden without help from
comparative samples, they have themselves demonstrated that they
are not readily identifiable and have a lower commercial value. Thus,
the amount of damages should be inversely proportional to the
amount of comparative aid needed to prove a plaintiff's case.
VIII.

Conclusion

The current state of the right of publicity represents the latest
step in the natural progression in this dynamic area of the law. The
courts have demonstrated their willingness to overrule or distinguish
adverse precedent in order to protect the commercial value in personality. The Tin Pan Apple case demonstrated that while some
courts are deferring to state legislatures, those legislatures are beginning to recognize the need to expand these statutes. Given the trend
toward expansion of voice and style protection, the right of publicity
is apt to be recognized in those jurisdictions that currently do not do
SO.
The previous judicial hostility toward plaintiffs alleging voice infringement has been lessened by the Midler and Waits decisions and
at least impliedly by the Tin Pan Apple decision. This trend toward
increased protection of a performer's style is likely to have a
profound effect on the rap music industry in particular. Today's rap
music recordings contain the large-scale use of digitally sampled portions of other songs, a usage referred to in the music industry as
"groove robbing."" 4 Does the logic of vocal style protection apply
213. MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3.4[C], at 3-16.
214. Harrington, supra note 175. Digital sampling utilizes computer technology to produce and copy any sound pattern that can then be reproduced or modified as desired.
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equally to protect a performer's musical style? This question215is likely
to be the subject of extensive litigation in the near future.

Another likely issue of contention is the effectiveness of disclaimers. A disclaimer states that even though a commercial has a

person who looks and/or sounds like a celebrity, it is not really the
actual celebrity. Nonetheless, the commercial has achieved its objective of evoking the identity of the celebrity in the context of defendant's product. 20 Thus, while a disclaimer may help avoid false advertising problems, the commercial is still an unauthorized use of the
celebrity's persona.217 The courts will have to analyze this issue. This
will prove a most difficult task, given the varying degrees of imitation, the prominence of the disclaimer, and the medium of the
advertisement.
Recent history demonstrated that right of publicity actions are
growing at a tremendous rate. To continue allowing large scale recovery in cases with limited visibility plaintiffs, such as Tom Waits,
will truly open the floodgates. Therefore, in order to effectively cope
with current and future right of publicity actions, the courts must
implement modified identification and damage calculation
procedures.
Steven T. Margolin

215. Digital sampling generally presents questions of copyright law rather than right of
publicity concerns because it is typically a musical recording that is sampled. However, Midler
has already indicated that the defendant may be liable for imitation of the plaintiff's style even
if the defendant obtained a license to use the copyrighted song. For a discussion of the digital
sampling issue, see Bruce J. McGiverin, Note, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright, and Publicity: Protecting Against Appropriationof Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1723 (1987).
The courts have previously declined to extend the right to imitation of musical arrangements. See, e.g., Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 341 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1975); Miller v. Universal
Pictures Co., 201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (N.Y. App. Div. 1906) (per curiam), modified, 214 N.Y.S.2d
645 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960), af'd, 180 N.E.2d 248 (N.Y. 1961).
216. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
217. See Allen v. Men's World Outlet, 679 F. Supp. 360, 362 nn.3, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

